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The American scholar Joseph Nye was the first to coin the term “soft power.” The 
soft power of a country is based on three resources: the culture, the value of internal 
policy, and the strength of the foreign policy. In international politics, soft power is 
among the ways in which success can be achieved without hard power. The concept of 
soft power has become an integral part of today’s language for Saudi Arabia’s political 
leaders, who use soft power to confront challenges with Iran. Such a concept has to be 
maintained for Iran to stop increasing its influence in the region. This thesis explores 
Saudi Arabian soft power aimed at counteracting challenges presented by Iran’s 
hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East. Accordingly, the thesis explores the tools at 
Saudi Arabia’s disposal that could enable it to counter Iran's ambition of dominating the 
Middle East and the rest of the Arab world. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The American scholar Joseph Nye was the first to coin the term “soft power.” The 
soft power of a country is based on three resources: the culture, the value of internal 
policy, and the strength of the foreign policy.1 The definition of soft power has been used 
as a catchphrase by many political practitioners, and is among the ways in which success 
can be achieved without hard power. The concept of soft power has become an integral 
part of today’s language for Saudi Arabia’s political leaders, who use soft power to 
confront challenges with Iran. Such a concept has to be maintained for Iran to stop 
increasing its influence in the region. Gallarotti and Al-Filali explained that Saudi 
Arabian “soft power has also been, and will continue to be, of importance in addressing 
two other important international problems/objectives that bear on regional peace and 
political stability.”2 
This thesis explores Saudi Arabian soft power aimed at counteracting challenges 
presented by the Iran’s hegemonic ambitions. Iran is an inevitably growing power, 
particularly in the Persian Gulf, and throughout the Middle East. Such a situation 
advocates utilizing soft power as a new medium to confront Iran. Saudi Arabian political 
institutions have developed soft power as a strategy to halt Iranian regional domination. 
This point necessitates the importance of activating soft power in the Kingdom. 
Increasing the official role and complying with the public effort enhance this 
confrontation, internally and externally. As such, this could be formulated within short-
term, mid-term and long-term strategic perceptions. A clear future vision should pave the 
way for an integral strategy for the Saudi soft power system, which should respond to 
such challenges efficiently. 
                                                 
1 Joseph, Nye. “Soft Power and Higher Education.” Internet and the University Forum, 2004. 
http://www.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/ffpiu043.pdf, 34. 
2 Giulio Gallarotti and Isam Yahia Al-Filali, “Saudi Arabia’s Soft Power.” International Studies 49, 
no. 3–4 (July 2012): 251. http://isq.sagepub.com/content/49/3-4/233.short?rss=1&ssource=mfr.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Iran has been a major threat to the Arabian Gulf regional countries. Saudi Arabia 
has been utilizing a soft power policy to challenge this threat. This thesis explores the 
concept of Saudi’s soft power in the context of confronting Iran’s challenges in the 
Middle East and Arabian Gulf. First, it briefly describes the origin of Iran’s influence in 
the region in terms of political and economic power. Second, it defines how and where 
Iran exerts its ideology. Third, it addresses the importance of soft power and its impacts 
on Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, specifically how the Saudi state uses soft power to 
change the power balance in the region. Noted regional specialist Anthony Cordesman 
has described this dynamic as “a broad regional power struggle that focuses on internal 
security, regional power, and asymmetric threats far from more than nuclear threats.”3 
Saudi soft power should play different functions in confronting Iranian challenges. The 
results of confronting these challenges do not equal the exerted efforts, and here lies the 
problem that motivates the following research questions: Why does Saudi Arabia 
implement a soft power policy despite Iran’s obvious threats? What are the optimal 
methods to employ the Saudi soft power policy to efficiently confront the Iranian 
challenges efficiently? To what extent is the Saudi soft power strategy effective in facing 
the Iranian challenges? 
Figures 1 and 2 provide maps for reference of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
  
                                                 
3Anthony H. Cordesman, “Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the clash within a civilization,” February 03, 2014, 
http://csis.org/publication/saudi-arabia-iran-and-clash-within-civilization.  
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Figure 1.  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
Source: CIA Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/sa.html. 
Figure 2.  Republic of Iran 
 
Source: CIA Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ir.html. 
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
The major research question is concerned with the possibility of Saudi Arabia 
establishing an effective strategy to deal with the Iranian threats. During the 1960s and 
1970s, Saudi Arabia and Iran had substantial political, military and security relations. 
However, after that period, their relationship became characterized with mistrust for each 
other, which eventually cascaded to hostilities. Considering the events that led to the 
1979 Revolution and the resulting anti-U.S. rhetoric that followed, Tehran began to 
regard Saudi Arabia as a proxy of the United States in the region, which it termed as “The 
Great Satan.” Saudi Arabia on its part sees Iran forming trouble in the region by 
exporting revolutionary ideology to the Gulf Arab states.4 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, like most countries in the world, encounters 
intertwined external and internal challenges in various fields and on different levels.5 The 
most critical of these challenges is that some regional forces are attempting to expand or 
dominate others. One particular example is Iranian ambitions. Iran challenges Saudi 
Arabia on both regional and international levels. The critical tensions between these 
countries involve doctrinal, social, political, economic, and security dimensions. This 
challenge becomes more dangerous in light of the continuous Iranian attempts to pursue a 
nuclear program and other weapons of mass destruction.6 
During the seventy-year of history of the U.S.-Saudi alliance, the beginning of the 
relationship between the two countries has evolved slowly, due to political difficulties.7 
Yet, the U.S. government is slowly becoming aware of the importance of the Kingdom in 
the international and regional arenas. The relationship between the two countries is not 
just a friendship, but rather a long-term strategic partnership. The United States and Saudi 
Arabia are strategic, political, economic and security allies in the Middle East. 
                                                 
4 Khosrow Soltani, “Iran-Saudi Arabia: A Troubled Affair,” Al Jazeera, November 20, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/11/iran-saudi-arabia-troubled-affair-
2013111961213978211.html.  
5 Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris & 
Co, 2013), 83. 
6 Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East, 90. 
7Wikipedia, s.v. “Saudi Arabia–United States relations,” last modified 26 November 2015. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Arabia%E2%80%93United_States_relations.  
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Undoubtedly, Iran is trying to expand its influence in the Middle East, but Saudi Arabia 
is the bulwark against this. Saudi Arabia is committed to non-interference in the internal 
affairs of other countries. It has denounced violence and its means, which disturb 
international peace and security. Saudi Arabia is also committed to international law, 
treaties, and conventions. For example, President Barack Obama’s last visit to Condole, 
Saudi Arabia, with the death of King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz accompanied by a VIP 
delegation from the Republican and Democratic parties, was to show both the 
appreciation of Saudi Arabia and the strength of their bilateral relations.8  
Iranian hostility originated after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Saudi Arabia 
grew steadily in terms of its territory borders, with the reunification of Shiite density 
provinces such as Ahsa and Qatif into the Kingdom.9 In return, this provoked Iranian 
hostility as the Shiite population of the Eastern Provinces became integrated into the 
Kingdom. Thus, that historical dimension has a crucial role in fueling hostility toward the 
Saudi Arabian state. Such historical heritage has never been ignored in this important 
struggle.  
Since the successful Khomeini revolution, Iran has planned to revive the ancient 
Persian Empire, and also establish a Greater Iran, or what is known as Shiite Crescent, 
which includes Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and territory south of the Arabian 
Peninsula.10 From Tehran through the territory of Iraq, passing the Syrian land and 
ending up in Lebanon, where Hezbollah and its central command in Beirut, Iran has 
worked to project an image as a leader of the Muslim world. Iran has actively advocated 
for their issue, and has adopted a public policy approach that tackled the feelings of 
millions of Muslims, and established organizations and groups that claim to stand by the 
oppressed and disadvantaged. The provisions of the Iranian Constitution depict these 
ideas and policies: Article 152 regulates Iran foreign policy and defends all Muslims’ 
                                                 
8 Michael R Gordon, and Baker Peter, “Top Officials Join Obama in Brief Visit to Saudi King,” New 
York Times, January 27, 2015,  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/world/middleeast/obama-leading-a-
high-powered-delegation-to-saudi-arabia.html?_r=0. 
9 Mabon, The Rentier State in Saudi Arabia and Iran, 81. 




rights with a commitment not to be biased toward the vast countries that dominate the 
other states; Article 154 states that the Islamic Republic of Iran must protect the equitable 
struggle of the deprived and oppressed in any corner of the globe.11 Under these 
constitutional provisions, Iran has felt panic, confusion, dissension and unrest in the 
region by agitating the Shiite minority in the Arabia Gulf States and the region. This has 
incited them to use revolution and violence against governments in the region under the 
pretext of injustice and oppression.  
C. SAUDI ARABIAN SOFT POWER INNOVATION 
Saudi Arabia should address the tensions in its relationship with the Iranian 
Islamic Republic and draw a distinct strategy to approach Iranian oppression. In his book, 
Innovation, Transformation, and War, James Russell describes strategic objectives with 
respect to the relationship between internal and external factors. At the strategic level, 
tensions manifest within the political institution and impact its ability to adapt the 
country’s doctrine to new challenges and threats. Saudi Arabia should embrace this idea 
of innovation and adaption in terms of soft power strategy to confront the contemporary 
Iranian challenges. Russell finds that “change is more likely to be stimulated by the 
senior civilian and military leadership through an ostensibly rational process.”12 In the 
confrontation with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s soft power doctrine gives the region a new 
requirement to pursue its strategy to achieve the goals of peace.  
The nature of the soft power process establishes peaceful relationships through 
soft power means and sources, in order to deter Iran from using its capabilities to threaten 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. The new image of Saudi Arabian soft power could 
attract the Iranian people and serve as the basis for more cooperation in terms of political, 
security and economic aspects for the prosperity of the countries in the Arabian Gulf 
region and the Middle East. The performance of Saudi Arabian soft power is 
                                                 
11 “The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Iran Human Rights Documentation Center,  
February 06, 2015, http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/english/human-rights-documents/iranian-codes/3017-
the-constitution-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran.html?p=20.  
12 James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar 
and Ninewa, Iraq, 2005–2007, Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011, 31. 
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demonstrated through the advanced tools and methods that Saudi Arabia must utilize with 
Iran to address the international relation principles and values. Saudi Arabia’s political 
institution should supplement its current foreign policy with some of the attributes and 
dimensions of soft power to include the economy, religion, culture, education and media. 
Saudi Arabia needs to embrace the concept of soft power. Essentially, it is not a 
weakness, but is a form of power; merely the failure to integrate it into the national 
strategy is a serious delusion.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The objective of this literature review is to provide a brief introduction of soft 
power strategy, including definition, resources, methods and tools. It will establish a 
theoretical framework for analyzing, describing, and testing the previously proposed 
hypotheses concerning the Saudi Arabia’s use of soft power strategy to influence Iran. 
This literature review will go further to suggest reasons for Saudi Arabia’s choice soft 
power strategy in dealing with Iran. 
1. Soft Power Strategy 
The concept of soft power is one of the new concepts that have been developed in 
the political atmosphere, in which political actors use the means and methods to influence 
others without the direct use of military force. Soft power is a form of power used by a 
state in its foreign policy to establish a broad framework of cultural patterns and 
behaviors.13 A state can utilize soft power to achieve a certain level of international 
influence. Various countries have perceived soft power as a substitute for hard power, 
which is an organized military instrument for achieving the nation-state’s interest in 
foreign policy. Countries have varied on the implementation of foreign policy in 
accordance with objectives, means, resources, time and spatial measures and external 
decision-makers. Soft power negates from a range of different behaviors and attributes in 
                                                 
13 Giulio Gallarotti, “Soft Power, What It Is, Why It’s Important, and the Conditions under Which It 
Can Be Effectively Used,” Division II Faculty Publications, 2011, 11 
http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/div2facpubs/57. 
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the state, in an attempt to promulgate it in accordance with what termed as the cultural 
invasion. 
2. Definition of Soft Power Strategy 
This paper explores ways that Saudi Arabia uses its soft power to influence Iran. 
Therefore, it is important to first define what soft power is. In his book, Soft Power: The 
Means to Success in World Politics, Joseph Nye defines soft power as “ the ability to get 
what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments,” and “the sources of 
soft power are the attractiveness of country’s culture, political ideals and policies. ” 14 A 
state’s soft power depends on its ability to perform as a role model and formulate others 
desire for the adoption of its values and lifestyle. One of the main advantages of utilizing 
the concept of soft power is the substitution of “carrot and stick” method. Others, such 
Joshua Kurlantzick, go further to explain soft power by incorporating elements of 
economic power with soft power, which both sit outside the security field to include 
investment and aid.15 In his publication, Kurlantzick is specifically interested in how 
China has expanded its soft power over the last decade to create the appropriate 
circumstances to transform to be an international force. 
The scholar Giulio Gallarotti notes that “soft power manifests itself in specific 
contexts and situations—that is, it depends on the relationship between action and policy 
orientations of particular nations and also the responses to these actions and orientations 
by other nations.”16 Soft power, according to Gallarotti is derived “from two general 
sources: International sources and domestic sources.”17 These contribute to a positive 
                                                 
14 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 
2004). 
15 Joshua,  Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, June 05, 2006, 2–7. http://carnegieendowment.org/2006/06/05/china-s-charm-
implications-of-chinese-soft-power/p4v. 
16 Giullio, “Soft Power, What It Is, Why It’s Important, and the Conditions under Which It Can Be 
Effectively Used,” 20.  
17 Giullio, “Soft Power, What It Is, Why It’s Important, and the Conditions under Which It Can Be 
Effectively Used,” 20. 
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image that endears “nations, which in turn enhances the nations’ influence in world 
politics.”18  
Hard power consists of elements that revolve around military and economic 
powers. This type of power is associated with the realist school in terms of using the 
state’s materials to shield its security. Gallarotti argued that the concept of hard power is 
in military power, the most traditional form of hard power that is commonly used to 
achieve the goals of the state. There are various forms of force, ranging from coercive 
diplomacy, which reflects the moderate use of force, to the direct use of military force, 
which is a more aggressive use. The successful use of hard power creates substantial soft 
power through attractive reverence and appreciation, although, hard power’s elements 
may destroy such positive images. For instance, military assistance and humanitarian aids 
increase a state with much military cooperation. Also, military and economic supports for 
probable adversaries promote willingness and respect. Therefore, combination of soft and 
hard power can be beneficial if they complement each other. But they can also counteract 
each other if they are not properly managed.  
Economic power should be excluded from policies and actions because such 
power does not leverage a state for persuasion. However, economic power could be 
combined with elements of soft power such as culture attractiveness, media influence, 
and aid. This is in agreement with Gallarotti's perspective that for soft power to be 
effective, it must be derived from two sources; international and domestic. From the three 
previous thoughts of soft power, Gallarotti’s assumption seems to be most appropriate to 
accept. 
3. Resources of Soft Power Strategy 
According to Nye “soft power is the ability to get what you want through 
persuasion not coercion.”19 Its tools, such as political and cultural values, media 
potentials, scientific and intellectual correspondence, and a foreign policy are capable of 
                                                 
18 Giullio, “Soft Power, What It Is, Why It’s Important, and the Conditions under Which It Can Be 
Effectively Used,” 20. 
19 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 6. 
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building bridges, linkages and alliances. There are two types of soft power sources. The 
first is national sources, which encapsulate a state’s attributes at home that enrich its 
image and legitimacy internally and externally. These attributes correspondingly enables 
the state to achieve the objectives of its foreign policy. In addition, the cultural and 
political institutions fall under the framework inherent in national sources. The second 
type is international sources, which refer to the need to recognize the state throughout the 
scope of the international relation, norms and institutions. Nye’s description of soft power 
has excluded economic power as it is a type of hard power.  
The capability that produces soft power emerges mainly from the values 
expressed by an organization or a realm in a culture, that hook the internal and political 
practices, and in the way it forms its relationships within the international community.20 
There are two main streams from which soft power stems its sources, domestic sources 
and international sources (see Table 1). Among the domestic sources of soft power, the 
culture of a nation plays a major role in formulation of its identity. The soft power 
created by culture is a consequence of nation norms and values. Cultural appearance to 
others can depict in showing respect and admiration. Lifestyle and its quality influence in 
a way that can render imitation or appreciation.21 Apart from culture, the political side of 
soft power resides in the political system of a state. It is not necessary to be a democratic 
regime to earn proper outcomes from soft power. There is much evidence that 
governments are neither democratic nor liberal, and they can induce stable political 
systems and, in turn, stimulate soft power.  
Another fundamental source of soft power is international sources. The 
collaboration in the international relation system is significant stream of soft power. The 
commitment to address various issues on the regional and universal arenas with the 
international norms and policies constitute the position and type of soft power. Enhancing 
an image on the international stage empowers the legitimacy of a nation, which in turn 
                                                 
20 Gallarotti, “Soft Power, What It Is, Why It’s Important, and the Conditions under Which It Can Be 
Effectively Used, 20. 
21 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 6 
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achieves the desired foreign policy goals. Such commitment and legitimacy image are the 
primacy sources of international soft power.  
Table 1.   Foundations of Soft Power 
Adapted from Giulio Gallarotti, “Soft Power, What It Is, Why It’s Important, and the 
Conditions under Which It Can Be Effectively Used,” Division II Faculty Publications, 
2011, 23. http://wesscholar.wesleyan.edu/div2facpubs/57.  
4. Methods of Soft Power Strategy 
Soft power entails utilization and investment of its strains to garner great 
influence in the global community and to draw a positive and solid image. Soft power has 
the potential to promote corporative relationships on the strategic level by investing in 
different international laws and multilateralism. “Both domestic and international 
International Sources Domestic Sources 
 
• Respect for international laws, norms 
and institutions 
 
• Fundamental reliance on multilateralism 
and disposition against excessive 
unilateralism 
 
• Respect international treaties and 
alliance commitments 
• Willingness to sacrifice short-run 
national interest in order to contribute 
towards the collective goals  
• Liberal foreign economic policies 
Culture  
• Pronounced social cohesion  
• Elevated quality of life 
• Freedom 
• Sufficient opportunities 
• Tolerance 
• Alluring lifestyle 




• A well-functioning government 
bureaucracy 
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methods of soft power reflect an emphasis on policies and actions oriented around justice, 
collective concerns, and rules of fair play.”22 
Nye expresses the role of the elite culture in the production of soft power, 
introduces the importance of academic and scientific exchanges, and ask how many of 
the Soviet scientists have been influenced by the American ideas and become activists in 
human rights movements in the former Soviet Union. Although, the United States is not 
leading all kinds of soft-power means, other countries, such as the former Soviet Union, 
had an extensive impact to boost communist parties in different regions of the world. The 
former Soviet Union exerted substantial efforts to expand the culture and arts, and 
participate in attractive humanitarian issues, in addition to the great scientific progress.23 
5. Tools of Soft Power Strategy 
To achieve this, Joshua Kurlantzick demonstrates that China serves as a model of 
utilizing conceptual tools of soft power. China has not only relied on diplomacy, though 
it has resorted to tools of soft power such as aid, investment and cultural diplomacy.24 
This Chinese attractive intervention exercises an outstanding success, represented by the 
rising popularity of Beijing in a number of countries that were disquiet about China. 
China attributes converged efforts towards the developing world. This possesses 
tremendous natural resources and emerging markets, which China needs to ensure 
economic growth in the future. In this context, China is keen to charm governments in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America by giving loans and assistance to finance projects in 
African continents. Thus, China has achieved drawing a rational image abroad. An image 
is seized from distinctive features, such as, socialism, adverse of the hegemony of the 
Third World, and supporter of the liberation movements.25 
A soft power tool of a state acts a vast part in defining its status quo on the 
national and international arenas. The concept of soft power defines such a power as the 
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ability to influence others. Soft power institutes elements such as institutions, resources, 
properties and capabilities as the tools of state influence. These elements interpreted 
through geographical dimensions, natural resources, economic capacities and political 
foundations, which enable the state to influence the behavior of other countries in the 
directions of its interests.26 These capabilities together establish the total strength tools of 
a state. The essential variances between them, related to the ability to influence, 
specifically during situations in which state interests are threatened or pressured.  
E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS  
The thesis puts forward three hypotheses to explore Saudi Arabia’s soft power in 
the context of the Iranian continuous influences and threat to the Persian Gulf countries 
and the Middle East. The first hypothesis is that Saudi Arabia uses soft power policy 
toward Iran because of Saudi Arabia’s concerns about security and stability of the Gulf 
countries. For instance, China attempts to expand its influences in Asia making Japan 
abandon its peaceful strategy and turn into a key player in Southeast Asia region.27 
Japan’s current national security strategy is informed by the ongoing dispute with China 
over some strategic islands in the East China Sea. Japan has launched increased amount 
of soft power’s influence in the region. Japan seeks to promote its image by providing 
military assistances, and showing the strength of its armed forces; in an attempt to hold 
regional alliances, and enhancing defenses and securities of neighboring countries to 
confront the Chinese tide.28 
The second hypothesis is that the Saudi Arabia uses soft power policy toward 
Iran’s threats because Saudi Arabia proposes to cooperate with Iran rather than confront 
it. For instance, the United States has incited many tactics to employ soft power with 
Latin Americas countries. The implementation of newer concept, rather than hard power, 
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has impacted in new era of cooperation in Latin continent.29 The U.S. supported foreign 
exchange programs such as economic, military and cultural to demonstrate to the Latin 
Americans that they are of significant countries that the U.S. must reach without 
sacrificing their securities.30 The United States chooses to help Latin America to increase 
prosperity and undergo its programs to promote democracy. The United States is able to 
deploy development, improve health care, address the threat of climate change and has 
been able to combine military power and economic supremacy to expand its soft power 
investments.31 
The third hypothesis is that Saudi Arabia’s use of soft power policy is a future-based 
strategy to influence the Iranian political decision-making. For instance, Egypt succeeded 
in restoring its leading role in the continent of Africa and Arab World, because of what is 
termed a “soft power.”32 Significant factors to measure and determine that Egypt strength 
in its regional surrounding and the international arena is the economy, technology, 
international cooperation, geographic area, population, language, culture and shared 
history. Religious and political institutions, al-Azhar and the Arab league, are influencing 
factors in the Arab World to address Arab and Islamic collective interests.33 Egypt has a 
common history with the majority of the Arab regions and the African continent, and 
contributed to draft a large part of the awareness of the people through literature, arts and 
culture. The Egyptian culture has an impact on the Arab societies through cultural 
activities such as the entertainment industry. In fact, Egypt produces the largest number 
of movies and television series in the Arab World, in addition to the largest number of 
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books and published scientific and scholars’ articles. The aforementioned facts, has given 
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II. IRAN’S TARGETING OF SAUDI ARABIA 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, having existed for around two and a half centuries, 
holds a great deal of influence around the world. It has become a pioneering country in 
both Arab and Islamic worlds due to its spiritual driving power and pioneering intellect.34 
Growing economic power has enabled the kingdom to develop itself locally while 
spreading its Islamic and political values and influence internationally. The Iranian 
Revolution of 1979, however, founded upon Persian expansionist ambition and a radical, 
sectarian, Shiite trend; upset the balance of power in Islamic and Arab regions. Set on 
spreading its power, Iran has become an opposing power and genuine threat to Saudi 
Arabia’s leadership in the Arab and Muslim world.35 
This chapter establishes the challenges that Saudi Arabia faces in dealing with the 
rival state of Iran. Part one explores the intellectual foundations of the Iranian state, 
ranging from sections and wording of the Iranian Constitution to its doctrinal and 
sectarian foundations that call for an Islamic army. Part one traces Iran’s exportation of 
revolution, its position as a chief energy producer, and its cultural and media exports in 
its attempt to spread Shiism. The paper continues by evaluating Iran’s current practices 
targeting the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Illustrated topics will include Iran’s discrediting 
of Saudi Arabia as a Muslim world leader, its use of the Hajj and Umrah Seasons to 
catalyze chaos and disorder and its efforts to convert Sunni Muslims to Shiism. Section B 
will also focus on Iran’s attracting of international powers to the Middle East, its direct 
intervention upon and breach of the autonomy of other states, the challenges its nuclear 
program poses to Saudi Arabia, and its economic and security targeting of Saudi Arabia. 
A. INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF IRANIAN CHALLENGES  
The most important reliable sources, which help identify the Iranian strategic 
keystones precisely and objectively, are represented in the transcripts of the Iranian 
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constitution which was laid down and approved by the Iranian regime. The constitution 
expresses the Iranian regime’s philosophy of rule, foundations, and objectives.36In 
political and government regimes worldwide, the constitution is considered the highest 
official political support and source. It defines the frames, generalities, limits, and 
channels of foreign policy in a country. The same applies to the constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran which mirrors the foreign policy and the country’s strategic 
objectives. 
The first Iranian constitution after the Iranian Revolution was issued on March 29 
and 30, 1979.37 After a decade, Khomeini himself issued an order on April 18, 1989 
through which he appointed a group of experts and assigned them to amend the 
constitution. The constitution was amended on July 28, 1989 after being accepted by the 
public and approved by Khomeini.38 By analyzing this constitution’s transcripts, preface, 
preamble, and amendments which concern this thesis, it is evident that Iranian challenges 
are based on several doctrinal keystones. These keystones will cover the doctrinal and 
sectarian foundation, the political dimension and its intellectual system, and the culture 
and media dimension.  
1. The Doctrinal and Sectarian Foundation 
The preamble of the Iranian constitution expressly states that the fundamental 
characteristic of this Revolution, in comparison with the rest of uprisings that arose in 
Iran in the last century, is the doctrinal and Islamic feature of the Revolution.39 In order 
to highlight this doctrinal feature, this preamble tackles the formation of armed forces 
under the title of “The Islamic Army” by saying: when forming and mobilizing the armed 
forces that protect the country’s interest, faith and belief must serve as a foundation and a 
base. Thus, the Iranian Army and Revolutionary Guard are formed on the aforementioned 
objective. Armed forces are not only responsible for protecting and guarding the borders, 
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but also bear the burden of their divine mission, namely Jihad in the cause of Allah and 
struggling to spread the provisions of Islamic Law worldwide.40 In addition, Article 144 
of the Iranian Constitution states that “the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be 
an Islamic army.”41 It should be a doctrinal and popular army. It must include only 
individuals who believe in the objectives of the Islamic Revolution and sacrifice 
themselves to achieve these objectives. 
These transcripts emphasize that the Iranian ideology is not only a national or 
racial ideology looking forward to restore the glories of the ancient Persian Empire, but 
also it is a dogmatic and sectarian ideology that goes beyond the concept of those 
national ideologies and limited ambitions. In order to achieve its doctrinal aspirations not 
only the national ones, it was necessary to form a creed army that takes on global divine 
tasks beyond the scope of defending homeland or maintaining national security. 
2. The Political Dimension and its Intellectual System 
Khomeini preached velayat-e faqih, a revolutionary theory, which means the 
direct supervision of the cleric (jurist) to ensure legitimacy in the Islamic society and the 
state. This is because the traditional Shiite rhetoric grants full legitimacy only to 
infallibles, which is the only qualification for achieving legitimacy over the people within 
the Islamic community. Export of this revolution theory occupies the central priority for 
velayat-e faqih to achieve the desired Shiite universality even at the expense of Iranian 
people and their welfare. Ayatullah al-Uzma Imam Khomeini emphasizes this by asking 
the Iranian public to be patient about not meeting their needs in order that the country’s 
officials are devoted for their Grand Mission which is represented in spreading the Shia 
doctrine worldwide. 
Therefore, Iran depends on carrying out its strategies by various, integrated means 
and mechanisms. These fall into what is known as “The Principle of Exporting 
Revolution,” which means the endeavor to wage similar revolutions in Islamic countries 
in order to unite them under the leadership of velayat-e faqih in preparation for the 
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establishment of the promised State of Ahl al-Bayt (People of the House).42 At the same 
time, export of revolution is utilized as a means to protect the Revolution on its own 
ground. Iran will not be secure from conspiracies weaved by great powers unless similar 
revolutions break out in the Islamic World. It is worth mentioning that the doctrine of 
export of revolution permits all possible methods from persuasion to force. However, the 
use of this power, especially the latter depends on practice on competence and 
opportunity circumstances—and political will.43 Thus, the Iranian regime also depends 
on exporting its revolution through influence and persuasion, especially after its defeat in 
the war against Iraq. Khomeini was forced by virtue of the International Resolution No. 
598 to ceasefire which he expressed by saying: “Accepting this resolution is just like 
drinking poison.”44 This has led the regime to reorganize its strategic priorities and focus 
on achieving self-sufficiency, especially in military fields, and developing it traditional 
and unconventional industries. Along with this, it resorts to exporting its revolution 
through what is called the Cultural Revolution. 
3. The Cultural and Media Dimension  
After its revolution triumphed, Iran established a supreme council of the Cultural 
Revolution, to extend the active centers in cultural aspects abroad. The Islamic Culture 
and Relations Organization (ICRO) was established in order to unite the policies and 
coordinate the cultural and media activities abroad, spread Shiism, support Shiite 
associations and activists, and coordinate Shiite efforts abroad.45 This Organization has 
representatives in 44 countries all over the world. Its most important subordinate 
divisions are “Ahl al-Bayt World Assembly.”46  
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Exporting the Revolution depends on the cooperation and coordination with the 
Shias abroad such as cooperating with Shiite Iraqi, Lebanese, and Gulf parties to spread 
Shiism in Islamic countries. Exporting the Revolution through traditional and modern 
media, the leaders of Iranian Regime, primarily Khomeini, recognize the significance of 
the various media in spreading Shiism and its cultures, ideas, and trends. Iran tends to 
export its Cultural Revolution through persuasive means and mechanisms. 
a. Spreading Shiism  
The International Center for Islamic Studies is responsible of the academic 
preparation of groups of Shiite’s Iranian emissaries and preachers.47 This explains the 
huge number of Shiite’s preacher and activists at the outset of the Iranian Revolution. 
Iranian preachers and emissaries abroad, try to lead the Muslim world citizens to be 
attracted to embrace Shiism.48 They are being qualified scholastically in Hawzas and 
Qom in order to be prepared to spread Shiism. The diplomatic business and Iranian 
embassies abroad: Iranian embassies and their cultural missions play a remarkable role in 
exporting the Revolution and spreading Shiism in the countries where they are. The 
cultural counsels in all Iranian embassies follow religious departments which are 
dominated by the extreme-right party in Iran.49 
Dissemination of Islamic slogans, by taking over the Islamic Nation’s causes, 
supports various Sunni movements and organizations. Iran tends to propagate Islamic 
slogans such as Islamic Unity claims to support international Islamic causes such as the 
case of Palestine. Iran also supports opponent movements and Sunni liberation 
movements such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, in order to improve its image, 
promote its model, and spread Shiism among Sunnis. Thus, a number of the cadres in the 
Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine have embraced Shiism.50 Annual conferences and 
forums and international assemblages: The Iranian Regime interest in such activities, in 
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order to export its Revolution, is evident because of their huge numbers and the great 
attention and budgets paid to them.  
The Hajj and Umrah Seasons are another way that Iran spreads Shiism. The idea 
of politicizing Hajj is associated with exporting the Revolution because the Two Holy 
Mosques, during Hajj season, are the best place and time for this theological activity. The 
idea of politicizing Hajj is not new when they decided that one of the requirements of 
Hajj is to declare the disassociation from polytheists through rallies and mob 
demonstrations. It is a mean that enables them take over the Two Holy Mosques, and this 
is what Khomeini has done recently.51 Therefore, Iran considers Hajj a unique occasion 
to spread Shiism and export the Revolution. Hence, Iran has established the “Iranian Hajj 
and Pilgrimage Organization,” which is sponsored by the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali 
Khamenei. He expressed that the continuation of cultural programs will turn Hajj into on 
ideal and unique opportunity to spread the principles of Islam and the Iranian 
Revolution.52 
b. Economic Dimensions 
Iran occupies an excellent geostrategic site because it is situated between the most 
important areas of producing oil and natural gas energy in the world, the Arabian Gulf in 
the south and Central Asia in the north including the Caspian Sea. Iran owns enormous 
resources of energy. Iran is a primary producer of oil, and it owns the world’s second-
largest natural gas reserve. Iran overlooks the Strait of Hormuz through which the 
Arabian Gulf states’ oil is exported abroad. It also controls the most important waterway 
in the world for transferring energy. Iran constitutes the most secure and economical land 
passage for transferring the gas and oil of the Caspian Sea.53 Iran employs all these 
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factors to promote its role in influencing this vital commodity. Producing and transferring 
oil in order to control its prices and flow, impose Iran as a regional and global power. 
 Iran’s endeavor to take control of the richest area of energy in the world is not to 
increase its wealth and achieve welfare and development for its people. It desires to make 
use of this area of influence in order to strangle the Arabian Gulf states and destroy their 
vital driving powers. This is to meet the requirements to establish the Iranian 
expansionary project in this area. Iran wants to launch itself as a regional and 
international power. Iran has emphasized that its dominance over the Arabian Gulf states 
equals the dominance over half the world.54 The other dominance over the half of the 
world would be realized in a subsequent stage through taking control of the area of the 
Caspian Sea and Central Asia. 
B. IRAN’S CURRENT TARGETING OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI 
ARABIA 
Iranian strategic tendencies and reflect a vision to establish an International Shiite 
State on the debris of the Islamic World. Specifically, Iran focuses on Saudi Arabia apart 
from other countries. In spite of justifying this with declared political interests such as the 
case of Gulf security and the Palestinian Case, fundamental reasons behind this relate to 
Saudi Arabia other than other countries. This explains the Iranian tendency of targeting 
Saudi Arabia.  
Undoubtedly, the Islamic conquest and the elimination of the Persian Empire in 
the era of Caliph Umar bin al-Khattab caused malice and hostility toward Arabs in 
general, and toward the Arabs conquerors that belong to the Arabian Peninsula and Hijaz 
in particular.55 This historical fact has caused Shias’ memories and feelings of sorrow, 
resentment, and subjugation towards this country and its people. It also evokes a security 
obsession and prospective apprehension, especially given the current successors 
following the Islamic guided methodology which was accepted and followed by the 
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pioneer conquerors. Today’s rulers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are the grandchildren 
of the Caliphs, and within Islam this is what the aforementioned events reinforce.  
If Iran takes control of the Two Holy Mosques, it would be able to spread Shiism 
and publicize the Guardianship of the Jurist widely among pilgrims and visitors of 
Kaaba.56 At the same time, Iran would be able to besiege the reformative call and try to 
prevent it from influencing pilgrims in general and the people of the Twelver faith in 
particular. The foregoing suggests that Saudi Arabia is targeted by Iran in several 
interconnected ways: religious, political, security, military, economic, media, and social; 
and these have created multiple impacts—domestically, regionally and globally. These 
challenges are exacerbated by the current revolution in information and communication 
technology57 and as a whole endeavor to achieve two purposes: to unsettle Saudi national 
security locally, and besiege its power abroad. 
1. Doctrinal Targeting 
(1) Discredit Saudi Arabia as a Muslim World leader 
The Iranian project has launched many campaigns against Saudi Arabia in 
particular that spring from the Shiite belief which regards Sunni Islam with all its 
different doctrines and countries as its primary enemy. The welfare of Iranians is 
sacrificed for the sake of establishing the international Shiite entity as supposed in its 
forecasts and myths. Iranian religious leaders realize that the Sunnis represent a vital 
trend which is considered the most dangerous and threatening not only for this project, 
but also for the heart of the Shiite ideology which constitutes the keystones and 
foundations of the whole Iranian strategy.58 
These disparaging campaigns aim at achieving the following objectives: 
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• Isolating the Saudi Arabian’s Sunni Islamic environment by depicting it as 
an invented new doctrine that is irrelevant to the known Islamic doctrines. 
• Making Muslim people oppose Saudi Arabia and its Islamic call by 
claiming that Muslims who follow the Sunni creed will be declared 
disbelievers. 
• Making the international community oppose Saudi Arabia call and 
symbols by accusing it unjustly of terrorism and supporting terrorists. 
(2) Use of Hajj and Umrah Seasons in Order to Deliver Chaos and Disorder 
Iran’s actions to make use of the Hajj season constitute one of the most important 
and dangerous Iranian challenges. The importance of this challenge comes from the 
importance of the ritual itself and its place and time because this challenge is periodic and 
happens annually. Iran insists on politicizing this ritual and defaces its religious features 
through inventions and innovations which breach the sacredness of the place and time. 
Moreover, this will lead to chaos and disturbances.59 
Iran’s endeavors to achieve objectives over the Hajj period can be centralized 
around the following: 
• Spread Shiism among pilgrims and to build the promised Shiit state to be 
joined by Muslims from all over the world. Downsizing the Saudi efforts 
exerted to spread the proper Islamic faith. 
• Unsettling security and spreading uneasiness in the Two Holy Mosques. 
• Publicizing its fanatic regime and aggressive policies. 
• Gradually continuing to impose pressures and raising the level of demands 
in order to reach its purpose in internationalizing the Two Holy Mosques. 
(3) The Endeavor to Make Sunni Muslims Embrace Shiism 
Iran employs its economic relations and aid to grant other countries in exporting 
its Revolution to spread Shiism and prove to the Iranian model in such countries. Ariel 
Farrar Wellman, a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) notes that 
“on the sidelines of November 2009’s Organization of Islamic Conference economic 
summit, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad met with Comoros President Abdullah 
                                                 
59 Ekhtiari Amiri Reza, Ku Hasnita Binti Ku Samsu, and Hassan Gholipour Fereidouni, “The Hajj and 
Iran’s Foreign Policy towards Saudi Arabia,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 46, no. 6 (December 
2011): 678–690, http://jas.sagepub.com/content/46/6/678.full.pdf+html. 
 26 
Mohamed Sambi to discuss the expansion of bilateral relations.”60 Iran has introduced 
industry aid and develops political relations with Comoros which is a Sunni majority 
country in order to achieve the goal of spreading Shiism.  
(4) Humanitarian and Relief Aids for the Distressed 
Iran exploits the need of the distressed in Islamic countries in order to make them 
embrace Shiism by providing them with humanitarian aid. In this regard, the relationship 
between Iran and Zimbabwe and the mutual official visits witness the attempts to exploit 
towards furthering its revolutionary principles. This instance depicts how Iranians started 
to use their economic power and humanitarian aid in order to use the poor population in 
Africa to exploit the need of the hungry people to eat in order to spread Shiism; this 
happens in Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Mali, and Ghana.61 
(5) The Personal Funding of Individuals  
Iran provides generous financial support to every influential figure who works to 
serve Iran’s trends. Ayatollah Qomi Athari emphasizes this Iranian commitment – in his 
speech at the International Conference of Fridays and Groups Imams, which was held in 
Qom with the attendance of scholars from 40 countries by saying, “Scholars, do not 
worry about the financial resources which will help you lead Khomeini revolutions in 
your countries, we have prepared a fund for financial aids from the Iranian energy 
revenues in order to help scholars topple the government of their countries.”62 
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2. Political Targeting 
(1) Attracting and Mobilizing International Powers in the Region 
Because of provocative Iranian policies and aggressive trends since the triumph of 
Khomeini’s Revolution, Saudi Arabia has welcomed Khomeini’s returning to his country 
and forming the Iranian government headed by Khomeini who has received 
congratulatory letter from Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on this occasion.63 Saudi Arabia also 
has sent another congratulatory letter to the Iranian government on establishing the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.64 However, since the overthrow of Mahdi Bazargan’s moderate 
government following the occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran, aggressive 
declarations against the Arabian Gulf countries started threatening to export the 
Revolution and overthrow their governments. This has pushed Saudi Arabia to embrace 
conservative attitudes towards Iran which has become a revolutionary power that 
threatens the region. In addition to its hostile attitude, the provocative act of occupying 
the American Embassy.65 This has led to increase the American presence in the region 
and changed the theory of the American administrations about Arabian Gulf security 
which was held by three U.S presidents: Nixon, Carter and Reagan.66  
(2) Direct Intervention in the Region 
There are many examples of Iran direct intervention in the region, such as the 
intervention in Bahrain, occupation of Emirates islands, direct intervention in Iraq and 
Syria, the endeavor to unsettle the relations among Gulf Cooperation Council States, and 
the increasing Iranian demographic danger in some Gulf countries.67 Iran exertion is to 
overwhelm and suppress Saudi Arabia with a Shiite crescent.68 This Shiite crescent 
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extends from Iraq in the north, Gulf countries in the east, and Yemen in the south through 
Houthis in North Yemen. The danger of Shiite increases with mobilizing the Shiite 
presence inside. Seemingly, Iran employs the Islamic speech and the sloganeering of 
Islamic slogans to revolutionize peoples in the region, provoke them against their 
governments, and spread chaos. 
(3) Nuclear Program Challenges 
The concern of Arabian Gulf countries, primarily Saudi Arabia, is ascribed in the 
fact that Iran Nuclear Program of, is meant for peaceful purposes as Iran claims. INP will 
end up in Iran’s possession of nuclear powers. Iran will be able to make a nuclear bomb 
or what is so called in the unofficial Gulf milieus the “Shiite Bomb.”69 This will lead 
other countries to endeavor to possess nuclear powers in order to maintain the military 
strategic balance in the region. 
In addition, there is a hazardous environmental challenge represented in the radio 
pollution. Any leak from the Iranian nuclear reactor in Bushehr which is at the closest 
coast to the Arabian Gulf countries. It is not unlikely that Iran will exploit its nuclear 
power in order to impose its sovereignty in the region and obtain the Western recognition 
of its dominant role. 
(4) Economic Targeting 
Iran’s taking control of the world’s resources of energy is done to target Saudi 
Arabia and try to dominate its national decisions. Iran desires to gain hegemony over the 
greatest source of natural resources. This will provide Iran with the strongest weapons in 
the region. Iran sought to achieve sovereignty in the international political view in order 
to pass over its policies and identify its expansionary projects. Moreover, Iran will earn 
enormous financial resources. Another significant aspect of Iran pursuit of economic 
targeting is the domination of the Two Holy Mosques—Mecca and Medina.70 Iran 
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considers itself a true believer and intends to control these two holy mosques. The control 
of these mosques will give economic and political advantages to Iran. 
Iran continuously threatens to occupy energy-rich gulf area to control the greatest 
energy resources of the world. The occupation of gulf area will render Iran enormous 
advantage in the security sector at the global level. Iran would bargain her enhanced role 
to improve its image and relations with the world and regional powers. 
3. Security Targeting 
(1) Mobilizing the Shiite Minorities 
Iran makes use of the Shiite minorities in the Islamic World; the percentage of 
these minorities ranges between 10–12%, and about 120 million Shiites of which the 
people of the Twelver faith constitutes about 80–90% and the rest are Isma’ilists, Druzes, 
and Nusayris.71 Since the “Islamic Revolution,” Iran has adopted the policy of exporting 
the Shiite revolution to the Arab and Muslim world. 
Iran desire to export Shiism to Arab and other Muslim countries was blocked by 
Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s rule. However, after the occupation of Iraq and subsequent 
domination by the Shite enhanced Iran’s influence in the region and facilitated spread of 
Shiism. After consolidating its hold in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, Iran used her 
sympathizers to create unrest in Yemen. For instance, Iran supported Houthis, a sub 
branch of Shite, to overthrow Yemeni President Saleh in bloody civil war. Iran provided 
weapons and guidance to Houthi rebels. Iran support to Houthis in Yemen is part of its 
overall strategy to control the Arab world.  
It is generally believed that shite minority population that lives in other countries, 
outside Iran are not loyal to their own country as much they are loyal to Iran. Iran 
cultivates shite minority to support Iranian ideology of domination of Muslim world, 
through spread of Iran’s brand of Islam—Shiism. It is the most dangerous and sensitive 
matter because it falls in the category of crimes against the state. These loyal minorities 
such as the Houthis in Yemen have turned from a religious movement into a political 
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movement due to the support of Iran. Houthis have become military arm of Iran, similar 
to Hezbollah in Lebanon. While Iran employs shite minority to work against their own 
states, however; Iran brutally suppresses minorities in in Iran, especially the Sunni 
Muslims.  
(2) Moving the Shiites Inside  
Shiite minority belongs to the Twelvers in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; this 
minority is centralized in al-Ahsa, al-Qatif, and some of their small villages in the Eastern 
Province. Moreover, there are small numbers in some villages of the holy city of Medina. 
The Iranian Islamic revolution, stemmed from Khomeini thoughts, has impacted the 
Shiite minority negatively in Saudi Arabia. Iran claimed the support of this minority in 
order to create instability within Saudi Arabia. Iran has sought to undermine the 
legitimacy of the government of Saudi Arabia. Such Iranian rhetoric is a form of political 
targeting to depict Khomeini’s regime as the leader of the Muslim world. 
In the mid of 1980s, the Iranian revolutionary regime established the military 
wing in the Arabian Peninsula. Khomeini called it the Hezbollah of Hijaz. This extremist 
group is responsible for terrorist operations in Saudi Arabia, in coordination with the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. Hezbollah Hijaz (Saudi Hezbollah) is the military 
arm of the Islamic revolution regime in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. Saudi 
Hezbollah challenges the legitimacy of the government of Saudi Arabia. It is founded by 
opponents of Saudi Shiites with the support of Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah of Lebanon. 
The aim of Khomeini in launching such militant movement was to weaken the Saudi 
government, and reduce Al-Saud religious status in the region.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, formerly unequaled in its influence over the 
Middle East, is challenged by the growing Islamic Republic of Iran. Each implements 
their own leading methods and philosophies when it comes to approaching Middle 
Eastern issues due to their distinct cultural backgrounds. The Iranian Islamic Revolution 
in 1979 damaged the Iran -Saudi Arabia relations of coordination and cooperation that 
had existed between the two monarchies before the revolution. The Nixon doctrine 
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during the seventies gave incentive to Saudi Arabia and Iran as power pillars in the 
region to fill the security void in the Arabian Gulf region. The Iranian Revolution 
changed the two countries into rivals, struggling for supremacy and hegemony in the 
region. The resulting impasse created a regional bipolarity as well as ideological and 
political battle, with Iran pursuing a Shiite pole and Saudi Arabia on the vanguard of 
Sunni ideology. Consequently, Tehran propagates a politico-religious model of Islam 
different from that supported by Saudi Arabia as genuine for the Muslim world. 
Iran’s efforts to spread its cultural and political power stem largely from its export 
of revolution. Its constitution calls for an Islamic army, Iran combines nationalism with 
dogmatism and sectarianism and aims to spread its beliefs of Shiism beyond its state 
borders in order to gain more leverage over other Islamic states like Saudi Arabia. Iran 
has been known to provide financial and humanitarian aid to Sunni Muslims in an 
attempt to get them to embrace Shiism, all while discrediting Saudi Arabia as an Arab or 
Islamic leader. Furthermore, Iran imposes upon the sovereignty of other states in the area 
and, in its export of revolution, undermines the power of other states in order to spread its 
own ideology. 
The decline or increase in the Iranian role in the Middle East seems to shuffle the 
cards in the region, and will determine the future shape of the Saudi Arabia-Iran relations. 
It is important that these relations take the form of relationship-oriented competition and 
more away from outright obvious hostility. Furthermore, perhaps this will lead to 
bilateral cooperation, resolve the hanging issues. Cooperation depends on the smart 
resources of Iran and Saudi Arabia, and is a more realistic approach to the future of 
relations between the two countries. Saudi Arabia ought to utilize its soft power 
resources, means and tools to come together to ease the tension with Iran. Soft power 
appeal is one of the most modern theories that have been implemented by many countries 
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III. ORIGIN OF SAUDI SOFT POWER 
Soft power is the political and cultural values, media capabilities, scientific and 
intellectual exchange and foreign policy that are capable of building bridges and linkages 
and alliances. The hard power needs both military and economic forces in order to enable 
any country to pursue with its political objectives. Saudi soft powers played different 
roles in Saudi life; particularly in its integration with the policies of the Kingdom in 
various fields. In facing the Iranian challenges based on doctrinal basics, these soft 
powers should play effective role. Therefore, this chapter addresses two issues: the first: 
origin of Saudi soft powers, the second is: their role in achieving Saudi strategy. 
Saudi Arabia has abundant amount of soft power sources with excellent resources. 
It also has several means and various tools. The sources and resources call the availability 
of power components and causes. Means or tools incite methods of using this power and 
ability to employ it. The concept of soft power includes two aspects: possessing of power 
causes and the employment of these causes in controlling the will and deeds of others.72 
For instance, the human development and relief aids, are considered among the sources 
and resources of its soft power. Its tools and means are represented, respectfully, in the 
organizations that provide quality products and media that promotes and publicize 
them.73 The media machine is the most important axes in wars. The U.S emphasizes this 
on clear and strong platforms that pumps such culture to the people of the world to 
achieve to achieve what the U.S intends to do. 
A. SOURCES OF SAUDI SOFT POWER 
As previously mentioned, several factors contribute to Saudi Arabia’s soft power. 
While some of these factors are material resources and so are tangible and visible, others 
are not, but their effects are equally strong. The most remarkable of those, which 
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collectively could be termed as moral sources of soft power, include Islamic doctrine, 
Islamic values, cohesion and adhesion among the Kingdom inhabitants, and international 
weight and regional clout.  
The most remarkable sources can be mentioned as moral sources of soft power:  
(1) Prevalence of Islamic Doctrine 
It is the origin and the greatest resource of Saudi Arabia’s soft power because it is 
the cradle of Islam and in the location of the two holy shrines where Muslims worldwide 
go for pilgrimage, at least once in their life time. A place the a place that assembles 
mammoth crowd of Islamic worshipers every year will no doubt exert reasonable 
influence within the middle east and across the globe. The religious significance of the 
Kingdom thus enriches its soft power capacity and enhances its ability to confront Iran’ 
challenges within the Middle East region.74 On top of these is the pure monotheistic 
Sunni doctrine, the sect to which most Muslims belong and which act as a basis of 
brotherhood among Muslims. Iran is predominantly Shia. The disproportionate size of 
Sunni population worldwide over Shia population gives Saudi Arabia a latent but very 
potent soft power over Iran in the Region. Therefore, these unique historical enrichments 
constitute source of moral soft power that support the Kingdom’s ability to exert great 
influence within the region. 
(2) Values System  
Values are considered as the accepted measure or standard for conduct and 
behaviors, in a group, organization or society. Therefore, it provides a basis for 
measuring whether something within a sociological setting is good or bad. Values can be 
categorized as ethical, Social, economic, cultural, political and religious. Saudi values are 
generally derived from Islam. Considering the influence of the religion on people, and the 
significance of Saudi Arabia as where the holy land located, Islam values plays a 
significant role in attracting more public support of government decisions both at the 
                                                 




domestic and international levels. Such public support of the government is no doubt a 
source of power for Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, including its relation with Iran. 
Saudi Arabia and its system of prevailing values contribute substantial amount in its soft 
power system.75 
(3) Harmony among Inhabitants of the Kingdom 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is generally homogenous society. This is because it 
has a dominant (Arab), religion (Islam) and language (Arabic). Similarly, Saudi people 
hold common traditions and cultural values that have not only created harmonious co-
existence of the people, but also a strong sense of nationalism and loyalty to the 
country.76 When compared to most other societies in the Middle East where 
heterogeneity has water down cohesiveness. Saudi Arabia’s homogenous society is 
considered a positive attribute and a strong source of its soft power. Unlike other 
societies that suffer from differences in these values among individuals of their 
communities, Saudi Arabia’ soft power has a local and international supporters for its 
role. International weight and capacity 
(4) International Weight and Capacity  
Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy emphasizes mutual solidarity, peaceful co-
existence, global stability, and support for and aid to other countries under crisis within or 
outside the Middle East. Internally, such foreign policy is derived from suitable and 
supportive environment for national dialogue among individuals and classes of the 
society.77 The Saudi government established King Abdul Aziz Center for National 
Dialogue (KACND) in 2003.78 The establishment of the King Abdul Aziz Center for 
National Dialogue (KACND) is to reinforce the role of civil community and 
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organizations in achieving justice, equality, and freedom of expression within the 
framework of Saudi cultural system. Internationally, Saudi Arabia calls for dialogue 
among followers of all religions and civilizations as a sustainable way of settling 
disputes. Accordingly, the King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz International Centre for 
Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID) was established to facilitate and 
sustain this effort.79 KAICIID provides the Saudi government with practical processes of 
how to achieve understanding and peaceful coexistence among people. The Center is 
designed to encourage religious consecration and spiritual piety of individuals and 
communities in order to renounce violence and extremism. KAICIID sets out to 
encourage and promote dialogue, understanding, respect, and cooperation among the 
people, and to stimulate justice, peace and reconciliation in order to eradicate violence 
and religious conflicts.”80 
B. MATERIAL SOURCES FOR SAUDI SOFT POWER 
1. The Two Holy Mosques in Mecca and Medina  
The Saudi government continues to develop the holy mosques sites, and the 
services provided to pilgrims and visitors in order to ensure the performance of rituals 
smoothly and easily. Every year, approximately three million people from all parts of the 
world visit Saudi Arabia to perform Hajj.81 These people return to their respective 
countries with positive image of the development works the government of Saudi Arabia 
undertakes to improve the services at two the holy sites. During the last decade, the 
Government of Saudi Arabia deals with different set of people with changed mindset due 
Global War on Terror (GWOT). The fair dealings of Saudi government to the people 
with different beliefs that annually visit Mecca and Medina gives positive and soft image 
of the people and government of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia annually coexists with the 
international political and economic developments and their impact on the pilgrimage 
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seasons, affecting and are affected by the evaluation of the success of pilgrimages 
seasons every year. Every year during the last decade, political repercussions in the world 
stand out in the seasons of Hajj, especially, after the September events, the United States 
and the war on terror, the future of Iraq and other Muslim political issues. Necessitating, 
The Saudi government to deal with different types of people in a political wisdom and 
vision to help in drawing the right image of Saudi Arabia as the Arab and Muslim leader. 
2. Financial and Economic Power 
An IMF country report in 2014 on Saudi Arabia economic and financial 
developments emphasized that Saudi Arabia has grown very strong in terms of growth 
rates in recent years, taking advantage of high oil prices, the strength of private sector 
activity, and government spending. The Saudi economy has an influential role in the 
global oil market system and its stability.82 The Kingdom occupies the first place 
worldwide in exporting petroleum and its reserves, and the fifth place in natural gas 
reserves. Moreover, the Kingdom is considered one of the most important members of 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC, and the greatest production 
swinger in affecting the prices of this strategic international commodity; which supports 
its soft power on all regional and international levels.83 
Saudi Arabia’s participation in the G 20 Summit as a member is because of its 
status as an important player in the energy market, as well as the large volumes of 
international trade and higher financial resources, which impact on the global financial 
system.84 The expansion of the Saudi economic role in the region contributed to the 
classification of the Kingdom among the top emerging economies of the world along 
with major emerging countries such as China, India and Turkey. This positive outlook is 
                                                 
82 Alfred, Kammer, and Traa Bob, SAUDI ARABIA (IMF Country Report no. 14/292), Washington, 
DC: International Monetary Fund, September 2014, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14292.pdf. 
83 Andrew. Butter, “U.S. Shale Oil is the New Swing-Producer: Output Forecast to 2020 Will Make 
Saudi Arabia Very Happy,” The Market Oracle, December 1, 2014, 
http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article48439.html. 
84 Sven Behrendt, “The G20 and Saudi Arabia’s Changing Foreign Policy Agenda,” Carnegie Middle 
East Center, September 21, 2009, http://carnegie-mec.org/2009/09/21/g20-and-saudi-arabia-s-changing-
foreign-policy-agenda.  
 38 
representative of the economic weight of the Kingdom as a center player in the Gulf 
region, the Middle East and the entire Arab nations. 
Another aspect of the financial power that Saudi Arabia enjoys is the initiative to 
lend loans to help poor countries to develop themselves. A significant body is the Saudi 
Fund for development which contributes through the provision of loans and funds and its 
activities have no defined limits geographically.85 The main objective of the Fund is to 
donate to development projects in developing countries by granting loans to those 
countries. The organization deals directly with the governments of developing countries 
to help finance most prioritized development projects. A typical example of project 
where Saudi Arabia has contributed significantly is the Marawi Dam in the Republic of 
Sudan, a project that is considered a model for Arab economic cooperation.86 Apart from 
bringing economic and social benefits to the people of Sudan, the Sudanese government 
is hopeful that the program will provoke a cultural shift along the line of social and urban 
renaissance in the country. 
3. Kingdom of Humanity  
Saudi Arabia is a leading nation in humanitarian assistance, providing for the 
needy in most countries of the world. In the last three decades Saudi Arabia has made 
remarkable strides, not only in terms of relief work and humanitarian assistance, but also 
in fostering regional and international cooperation. Such facts are clear according to the 
latest data released by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, which imply that 
Saudi Arabia is the first country in the Arab and Muslim in the proportion of its gross 
domestic product GDP.87  
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Saudi Arabia’s humanitarian assistance has reached more than 80 countries 
through different official and unofficial agencies.88 WFP Executive Director, Ertharin 
Cousin, called Saudi “Kingdom of Humanity” because of the state’s contributions to 
resolve food crisis across the globe.89 The humanitarian reputation Saudi Arabia has 
succeeded in building for itself is a form of soft power because such gestures have the 
capacity to win the hearts and mind of recipient governments and their people.90 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia could use its humanitarian aids to exert influence and control 
events beyond Arab and Muslim countries. 
C. MEANINGS AND TOOLS OF SAUDI SOFT POWER 
Meanings of Islamic Da’wah—missionary work: 
• King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Glorious Qur’an, its 
translations, records and distribution in different countries of the world 
exemplifies a strong tool for exercising Saudi Arabia’s soft power.91 This 
is in view of the influence Islam has on its true followers. The 
establishment of the complex came in fulfillment of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia’s leading role in serving Islam and Muslims, and an extension to 
what Saudi Arabia has been honored by as the custodian of the holy 
shrines. All these facts reflect the leading role of Saudi Arabia in serving 
Islam, Muslims and care of Holy Quran. 
 
• The Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawah and Guidance is 
another soft power tool.92 The Ministry, which was established in 1994 is 
responsible for the developments of mosques and endowments in all 
Muslim countries; the advocacy and attention to Islamic issues globally; 
communication with the Islamic associations centers, and cooperation 
with them as appointed by Muslims values to spread such values 
worldwide; the supervision of the Islamic centers to help Islamic 
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minorities and communities abroad; coordinate the efforts and support the 
Islamic organizations, universities and institutions, and to highlight the 
role of the Kingdom in supporting all Muslim countries concerning 
Islamic issues. Coordinating the efforts and support the Islamic 
organizations, universities and institutions, to highlight the role of the 
Kingdom in supporting all Muslim countries in all Islamic issues. The 
mission of this Ministry is to contribute to the achievement of Islamic 
solidarity and interdependence. Serving Muslims around the globe in all 
aspects of their life, the ministry addresses all issues that Muslims face 
through their life.  
The foregoing suggests that the mission of the two Dawah bodies mentioned 
above is to encourage worldwide Islamic solidarity and interdependence among Muslims 
while attending to their needs and welfare. Similarly, the two Islamic Dawah bodies are 
established to propagate the right understanding of Islam’ strand “Sunnah” throughout 
the Arab world and other Muslim countries, especially among those countries already 
under Iranian influence or about to be. These initiatives give Saudi Arabia the soft power 
to win the heart and minds of the Muslim people all around the globe.  
D. MEDIA AND CULTURAL MEANS 
Joseph Nye explains that soft power is based on informational, cultural, 
commercial influences, public relations, and all other resources that do not fall within the 
classified military capabilities of an organization or state, which he refers to as hard 
power. The government needs to explore and convey positive and soft image of the 
Kingdom by focusing on media and culture. Iran, being opposed to Saudi belief, has 
effectively used to projects its liberal image and revolutionary ideas. The Government of 
Saudi Arabia must counter Iranian propaganda through effective use of media and its rich 
Arab culture. 
Nye perceives that the feasibility of soft power depends on the credibility of the 
media, especially in light of large number and diversity of these means and the frenetic 
competition is imposed on the recipient. The receiver often finds the most credible 
means, and the build-up relation between them serves the concept of soft power. 
The Saudi Ministry of Information was created in 1962. However, in 2003, the 
responsibility of propagating the country’s cultural heritage was included as part of the 
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Ministry’s responsibility.93 Accordingly, it became known as the Ministry of Culture and 
Information with responsibility to administer the Kingdom’s print and electronic media. 
Additionally, the Ministry is saddled with the responsibility to coordinate the Kingdom’s 
relations with international press.94  
The Saudi media, throughout its history has been an influential strategic tool in 
the internal and foreign policy of the Kingdom. Saudi media and culture has the ability to 
address ongoing media attacks from abroad and the ability to use the Saudi media and 
cultural machines as an intermediary to generate a national sense and national belonging. 
More important, the Saudi media and culture are unique tools to fight extremist thoughts 
and a catalyst to spread the different aspects of the Saudi culture. Saudi media policy 
continues to be the engine for all business and media activities. Saudi media policy 
continues to be the engine for all business and media activities issued or deal with by the 
Kingdom. The Kingdom media policy is carefully considered, which is in consistent with 
the direction of the Kingdom and its Islamic identity. 
E. POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC MEANS 
Indisputably, Saudi Arabia exerts soft power and role of global leadership, not 
only in the field of oil or the international economy, but its contribution to stability and 
peace in the Middle East region.95 Many Arab countries have suffered and still suffering 
from continuous armed conflicts due to insurgent political movement within their 
societies, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, Saudi Arabia has always served as a 
safe home for all the Arabs and Muslims from all part of the world.96  
During the seventy-year history of the US-Saudi alliance, the beginning of 
relations between the two countries developed slowly, but the bilateral relationship 
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during the seventy years moved towards optimization.97 The U.S and Saudi Arabia have 
faced different political difficulties and ultimately have overcome them, because the U.S 
government is well aware of the importance of the international and regional weight of 
the Kingdom.  
The relationship between the two countries is not just a friendship, but rather a 
long-term strategic relationship. In Middle East region, and in terms of political, 
economic, and security policies, Saudi Arabia is the only country in the region to assure 
the United States such trust.98 Realizing their mutual importance, the two countries have 
agreed that their strategic alliance must continue to grow in strength not withstanding 
their differences. 
Iran is trying to expand its influence in Middle East for a long time, but the 
Kingdom is the main bulwark against this expansion, with Saudi Arabia’s commitment to 
non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.99 Saudi Arabia has always 
denounced the violence and all the means of disturbing international security and peace 
and to emphasize the principle of peaceful coexistence among the nations of the world.100  
Saudi Arabia desires the stability of world oil markets, and strives for the 
development of international trade on a fair basis and foundations of free market 
economics. It is also committed to the rules of international law and international treaties 
and conventions.101  
Diplomacy is based on official contacts between the states. Nye explains 
Diplomacy in which public opinion plays significant role. States and countries try to 
persuade the subjects of the other countries to shape their opinions to achieve their 
political, military, and economic objectives. For example, during the Cold War, the west 
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shaped the world opinion in favor of capitalism against the communism. The goal of 
diplomacy is to market the foreign policy of a state to the public opinion in other 
countries in normal times on one hand, but in times of crisis it is more concentrated in 
mobilizing the national political and military capabilities to defend its interests. 
Conferences, exchanging delegations, and official visits are vital part of the effective 
diplomacy. The number of Saudi diplomatic missions abroad amounted to 156 mission 
and there are 130 foreign missions in the Kingdom from different countries of the 
world.102 In addition, the Kingdom joined many Arabic, Islamic, regional and 
international organizations like Muslim World League, Gulf Cooperation Council, and 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Saudi Arabia has always directed its diplomatic 
efforts to spread the positive image of the Kingdom throughout the World.  
F. EDUCATIONAL MEANS 
Saudi Arabia has increased its global markets after the 1970s oil crises. The oil 
market started to boom again that enabled Saudi Arabia a wealthy fortune of economy 
that enabled it to spread out its soft power. Such soft power includes the education part, 
which enabled Saudi Arabia to deliver the Islamic fundamentalism worldwide in order to 
preserve its position as a leader in the Muslim and Arab world.  
According to Wager Cooper & Yue, generally, Saudi Arabia reached out to the 
world throughout creating large numbers of Islamic institutions, center, mosques, schools 
and colleges. For instance, Saudi Arabia financed the Islamic institutions in the Africa, 
Far East, Russia, Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Isles of Fiji, North and South 
America and Canada.103 In fact, part of the Kingdom’s educational program was 
established by King Fahad’s donation program, which focused on delivering a translated 
copy of Holy Quran to pilgrims visiting Saudi Arabia within their languages, as well as 
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delivering copies of the Holy Quran to civil and governmental organizations 
worldwide.104 
The authors point out that the Saudi academic programs globally were designed to 
deliver the Muslim children and youth with the opportunity to be taught and enhanced in 
their responsibility in the Islamic principles, culture, and language while they are living 
abroad within their society.105 For instance, as part of the Saudi academic programs 
worldwide, the initiation of the Islamic academy in Washington, DC, that holds over one 
thousand students with a cost of over 100 million Saudi Riyals. Also, king Fahad 
academy in London that hosts a large number of international students. These academies 
including the one in Moscow, target to sponsor Islamic religion and culture for the people 
who live in those countries.106 
Finally, it is important to stress on the fact that the kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 
utilized a huge part of its capital to serve as educational programs as part of its soft power 
system. Such programs provide the Saudi soft power a greater image of cradling Islam 
and its culture in the Arab, Muslim, and non-Muslim nations.  
G. THE ROLE OF SOFT POWER IN ACHIEVING SAUDI STRATEGY 
In order to quell the threats Iran poses towards the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and 
in order to gain as much leverage as possible over this belligerent nation, Saudis must 
unleash their inherent wealth of soft power over Iran. As evident in its post-Revolution 
constitution, Iran has constructed a state around doctrinal and secular foundations. 
Calling for an “Islamic Army,” Iran’s Constitution transcends beyond traditional 
nationalist ideologies by strictly asking its citizens to adhere to values stemming from its 
Islamic Revolution. Iran asks its inhabitants to give up their personal needs in order to 
allow Iranian leaders to fulfill their visions of establishing a worldwide Shiite order. In an 
effort to gain further international power and to convert Sunni Muslims to their Shiite 
                                                 




faith, Iran systematically targets the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a state that embodies and 
defines the traditional lifestyle of Sunni Muslims. 
Iran primarily relies on its exportation of revolution to combat Saudi Arabia’s 
influence in the Middle East. If other revolutions take place in the region, powers like 
Saudi Arabia will be less likely to thwart Iran’s plans. Iran uses organizations like the 
Islamic Culture and Relations Organizations and its supreme council of Cultural 
Revolution to spread its Shiite cause through the media.107 Geographically, Iran controls 
the Arabian Gulf in the South and the Caspian Sea in the North. As Iran controls much of 
the world’s oil and natural gas, the state also has an economic edge over its neighbors, 
and Iran seeks to use its economic position as a means of economic warfare rather than as 
a means of bettering its own economy. Iran hopes to discredit Saudi Arabia as a Muslim 
world-leader and encourage Sunni Muslims to embrace Shiism by practicing forms of 
clientelism and providing humanitarian aid to Sunni Muslims in distress. Iran is not afraid 
to impose upon the sovereignty of other states in order to meet these goals. In addition, 
the state has begun intimidating other world powers with its nuclear energy program that, 
if unmonitored, could prove to have bellicose motives. 
To combat these challenges, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should reform the 
ancient teachings from which it derives much of its power, by emphasizing values of 
moderation, tolerance and dialogue to disconnect Shiites in Saudi Arabia from those in 
Iran. The Kingdom should hold further lectures, lessons, forums and conferences to 
stimulate domestic intellect and to give the world a way to learn about its culture and 
society. These symposiums could perhaps take place in the two holy mosques, giving 
these important buildings further use. The Kingdom should also make use of its many 
scholars who are able to speak foreign languages, as these academics can teach foreign 
territories about Saudi Arabian culture. As it is 2015, Saudi Arabia should also look into 
using Internet technologies to spreading information in addition to printing more 
magazines, and the Kingdom should also reconsider its current rules regarding women’s 
rights of employment, participation and endowment. Saudi Arabia should attract foreign 
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students to its land by enacting fellowships to encourage the intellectual side of its nation. 
The Kingdom ought to continue its domestic and political reforms, strengthen its radio 
broadcast programs, and employ further soft economic powers like controlling oil prices 
or influencing Iran’s relationships with China and Russia in order to prevent Iran from 
taking on extremist policies. The Kingdom should combat Shiite terrorism and up its 
humanitarian aid to combat Iranians that are gaining support by doing the same. Saudi 
scholars, most importantly, need to receive funding allowing them to research properly 
different forms of soft power and the various ways their Kingdom can triumph over the 
threats Iran poses it.  
H. CONCLUSION  
Saudi Arabia is embodies countless forms of soft power it can use to combat Iran 
as Iran continues to strive for more regional and international power. Perhaps most 
obvious is the Kingdom’s abundance of soft power derived from a moral standpoint, as 
the Kingdom holds the original monotheistic Sunni Muslim doctrine and Sunnis are the 
majority of the Muslim faith. As a nation, Saudi Arabia is an example of harmony and 
has vast international weight as a Muslima, world, and regional leader. The Kingdom 
boasts the material soft powers of its two holy mosques, which can be used to hold 
conferences represent culture, as well as the material soft powers that come hand in hand 
with being a world-leader in the exportation of natural gas, oil, and loans to 
underdeveloped states in need of assistance.  
Saudi Arabia is a leader when it comes to humanitarian relief work, assisting over 
80 states across the world and arguably leading the effort to combat famine around the 
world. Additional soft powers include Saudi Arabia’s political friendship with the United 
States and its controlling of the media through its Ministry of Information. The 
Kingdom’s expansive educational system also helps wage power over Iran through 
enlightening the masses of its history, culture and teachings. Saudi Arabia, should it wish 
to limit Iran’s influence over the Muslim community or the international arena, needs to 
take advantage of the various soft powers it has, by spreading its own teachings and 
funding research that will help it find better ways to exert its soft power. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
A number of useful conclusions could be reached from the study:  
Spread Shiism amongst Sunni followers through Iran’s claims of their love for Al- 
Bait. This is to gain Sunnis sympathy in favor of the Shiite and acceptance of governance 
of the Faqih. Iran has always ensured gradual embracing of Shi’ism especially through 
the provision aids and assistance in an attempt to convert Sunnis to the Shiite doctrine. 
Endorse the Twelvers doctrine among the different Shiites strains and connect 
them politically with Faqih governance in Tehran as the Shiite political center of the 
world. In line with this philosophy, a Shiite state must be obeyed in all political 
viewpoints. This is also based on the concept of the absence of the Imam Hidden 
Imam.108 Taha Ali Alsawah in his book Al-Azhar’s position on the Shia Twelver stated 
an example of this is what was issued by some Al-Azhar scholars in 2008. In an official 
statement, they outlined the reality of the division between Shiites regarding the religion 
as a whole, as well as its branches. The statement revealed the following: the attempts at 
rapprochement between Shiites and Sunnis are useless against the insistence of the 
Shiites to pursue their objectives of Shiite doctrine expansion and the political dominance 
of Iran. The time has come for Islamic scholars to explain and advise the Islamic leaders 
of the risks of the Shiites’ expansion. The Shiites have allocated billions of dollars to 
their efforts with the intention of encouraging Sunnis to convert to Shiism and destroy the 
Sunni states. Announcing that, the Persian dominance has been practicing in the name of 
resistance as in Lebanon, or in the name of revolution as in Iran or the elimination of 
discrimination and persecution as in Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.109  
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The main Iranian challenges are rooted in the Shiite branch of Islam—the 
sectarian orientation on which Iran is founded. Accordingly, Iran’s basic political 
motivation is based on its Shiite sectarian doctrine rather than the repeated claims that it 
stems from Persian nationalism. Also, Iran’s constitution supports the claims that Iranian 
challenges are based on the Shiite sectarian doctrine and partly served the purpose of 
achieving these sectarian goals. Furthermore, Iranian ideology is not a Persian national 
ideology aiming only to restore the glories of the defunct Iranian empire. Rather, it is a 
sectarian religious ideology that transcends greatly from the concept of nationalist 
ideologies, with limited aspiration for nationalist goals, objectives, or inclinations. This 
desire necessitated the establishment of a sectarian army to shoulder international 
revolutionary duties which go beyond the scope of defending the country or the 
achievement of national security from the rest of the globe. 
Iran’s current constitution emphasizes more on sectarianism rather than 
nationalism. This is affirmed in Article 15 of the constitution, which makes the Persian 
Language the official language of the country.110 The decision to have a Persian official 
language alongside a sectarian national ideology is contradictory. A nationalist ideology 
reinforced by a Persian national language, or a sectarian national ideology alongside the 
Arabic Language would have served the country better. If Iran could reinforce its current 
sectarian ideology with Arabic as the official language as other Shiite population in the 
Middle East, there will be better cohesion, solidarity, and understanding within the region 
due to commonality of language. Again, the provision in Article 115 of the Iranian 
constitution that the president must be of Persian nationality and believe in the official 
madhhab (Shiite doctrine of the Twelvers) is a source of conflict in the region 
considering the fact that Iran comprises other ethnic nationalities.111 This provision, 
which was included in the Iranian constitution by Grand Ayatollah Khomeini after the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979, disenfranchises other eligible candidates that might want to 
run for president.  
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It is worth mentioning that Khomeini’s revolution was no more than a Shiite 
religious revolution against the Persian nationalism which was not the case during the 
reign of the Shah of Iran. This is represented by the Twelvers concept based on 
Khomeini’s Faqih governance and the domination of its supporters over mainstream 
fundamentalists. The import of this is that a Shiite Iran is more dangerous in the Middle 
East than a Persian Iran. This is because a Shiite Iran is evidently and visibly based on 
aggressive and extremist ideological concepts as the world is experiencing today. Iranian 
rhetoric and speeches is most times characterized by emotion-laden propaganda, hostility 
and aggression since the 1979 revolution, simplifying Saudi Arabia’s soft power drive. 
The Faqih governance and its domination over internal and external Iranian 
affairs were based on three components: intellectual; concept-sharing of globalizing 
revolution, and Islamic unity (along Shiite doctrine). These concepts, which aims to 
position Iran to dominate Islamic countries under the flag of the Twelvers Shiite and to 
formulate one nation under the governance of the Faqih, converges into what experts call 
an exportation of revolution. The exportation of revolution is a group of means, 
mechanisms and political strategies, on which Iran intends to achieve dual aims of attack 
and defense, internally and externally. Through the exportation of revolution in targeting 
and disturbing other states, Iran aims to create suitable opportunities for replacing the 
governments of these states with pro-Shiite governments. At the very least, Iran can 
dominate their national politics in preparation for Shiite expansion. By so doing Iran can 
protect its interests and achieve the required security for the expansion of its 
revolutionary regime through the grant of protection. This is based on the concept that 
attack is the best form of defense. Through this dual objective inherent in the concept of 
the exportation of revolution, can be recognized the significance of revolutionary guard 
to shoulder the major responsibilities of Iran’s revolution exportation in addition to 
protecting the revolutionary regime.  
There is need to differentiate between two key components of Iran’s exportation 
of revolution. One is related to the thoughts it intends to export, while the other is 
concerned with the means of exporting these thoughts. The exportation of revolution is 
dynamic and fluid—ranging from military and security, through political, to economic 
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dimensions. Also, there are other components of the exportation that are dependent on 
domestic, regional and international factors. The Khomeini regime depended on the 
exportation of revolution by articulating these components in the use of proxy forces to 
replace the ruling Ba’ath regime in Iraq with a Shiite government after military option 
failed in the Iran—Iraq war. The formation of Hezbollah Al-Hejaz by Iran in 1987 and its 
activities in the region since then lays credence to this claim. Currently, Iran’s also uses 
proxy forces like the Houthis in Yemen to gain dominance over the Arab countries. 
These proxy forces shield Iran from attack by adversary nations because any attack or 
aggression on Iran from any power in the region or internationally will be greeted by a 
corresponding attack from its proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in 
Yemen. In addition, this action is intended to enhance its security and defense, and to 
prevent other international powers from choosing a military action. Again, by so doing 
Iran intends to divert international attention from its nuclear program. 
In the light of the foregoing, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, through its genuine 
Islamic symbolism, its adoption of the Islamic concept, and its leadership of the centrist 
Sunni sectarian ideology has come to represent the most dangerous enemy of the Iranian 
Shiite ideological and sectarian project. Saudi Arabia would have to bring its soft power 
to bear to effectively confront the well-articulated Iranian revolutionary trajectory within 
the Middle East. The Shiite loyalty created by the Khomeini regime after it took over the 
government in Iran created problems in the Arab and Muslim countries. One of the most 
significant discoveries of this study is the conjugation between the Shiites’ existence and 
the unrest, disturbance, and chaos it creates in the Sunni countries where Shiite minorities 
reside. The foregoing suggests that the priority of loyalty to Shiite doctrine over national 
loyalty by Shiite minorities in the Arab and Muslim countries other than Iran is the most 
dangerous problem facing Shiites minorities. Loyalists to the Faqih governance in Iran 
most times run counter to the laws of the countries where minority Shiites exist.  
The Iranian targeting of Saudi Arabia is the result of several key factors. Saudi 
Arabia represents the most superiorly acceptable Islamic Sunni state because of its 
historical Islamic precedence, and the holiness of its geographical area, as well as its 
political and economic position within and outside the region. In addition, the state 
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follows a very specific, respected Sunni doctrine, which disagrees with the Iranian Shiite 
doctrine. Furthermore, the Kingdom commands heavy regional and global acceptance, 
and outstanding status in the world community due to its moderate policies, peaceful 
disposition, and continued support of other states. These exceptional and sterling national 
qualities annoy Iran and stand as an obstacle that limits Iran’s ability to project power and 
influence. Consequently, Iran attempts to undermine Saudi’s leading role in both the 
Arabic and Islamic worlds and its viability in international relations.  
Soft power and its elements enable Saudi Arabia to face the Iranian challenges 
with efficiency and professionalism. Besides, Saudi Arabia is a country that is unified 
and linked as one body due to its common ethnicity and religion. The origin of Saudi soft 
power is illustrated in its Islamic acceptance among the Arab and Muslim World. 
Consequently, Saudi Arabia’s influence is based on power of attraction and persuasion of 
Arabs and Muslims. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia must continue to coordinate its soft 
power in order consolidate on the gains made so far. It could be useful to propose the 
establishment of higher council to plan and organize soft power different activities. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study proposes the activation of Saudi soft power as a complementary system to 
confront Iranian challenges. This should include programs and practical mechanisms that 
can support inherent strength, weaknesses, opportunity, and threats in transforming Iran’s 
strengths into weakness and limit its available chances of projecting power. 
Saudi soft power should start with future perception generated from the roots of 
reforming its Islamic teachings. This is the basis on which the Kingdom was founded ab 
initio. It is also the source from which Saudi Arabia derives its legitimacy summarized in 
the proclamation of Islam. The Kingdom must assume the responsibilities of its 
proclamation of Islam and direct this not only to the Arab and Muslim Worlds but to all 
around the globe.  
Saudi Arabia needs to consolidate loyalty among its citizen, especially among 
students through the demonstration of achievements, developments and its position in the 
international community. In addition, The Kingdom must instill values and moderation, 
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tolerance, dialogue and acceptance of others and avoid extremity in views or stand-up 
points. Saudi Arabia must indirectly work to disconnect Shiites minority from Iran’s 
influence and the Faqih system in Tehran. Awareness programs directed at the Shiite 
communities explaining the risks of following the Khomeini rule and its revolutionary 
principles should be organized regularly within and outside Saudi Arabia. These 
programs should address the untrue idea of the Faqih and the promised state.  
Saudi Arabia must concentrate on identifying the dangers of the Faqih governance 
ideologies towards Shiite minorities in the long run. The Kingdom must draw attention to 
Iran’s targeting of Saudi Arabia, confirming that this targeting in reality is targeting 
Islam, Muslim nations, and their innocent citizens. Meeting such goals will require Saudi 
Arabia’s cooperation with different states, groups, and Islamic organizations against 
Iranian revolutionary expansion. Saudi Arabia must configure a proclamation axis, its 
programs and means (short, middle and long terms). Also, it would be worthy holding 
proclamation lectures, forums, symposia, and conferences within and outside the 
Kingdom, and to gain from them intense international participation.  
Saudi Arabia should also consider generating qualified preachers and increasing 
their numbers according to well-articulated and future oriented plans. Also, there is need 
to increase the publication and distribution of various printed religious materials to aid 
the preachers and spread of Islamic piety, morals, values, and principles. The Kingdom 
should also utilize Friday preaching, hajj and Umrah seasons to increase the number of 
endowment centers in and outside the Kingdom. Furthermore, the two holy mosques 
could be used to intensify lessons and guidance to the millions of pilgrims that visit the 
country each year. The Imams of the two holy mosques could be effectively utilized by 
organizing periodical visits to Muslim states and their endowment centers. Saudi Arabia 
should arrange other periodic programs where elites and intellectuals from various 
countries convene in the two holy mosques. The Kingdom needs to establish effective 
Islamic centers in Muslim countries, where there are minority Muslim communities, in 
order to educate these minorities to eschew suspicious activities. 
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The Kingdom’s status as the original symbol of Islamic religion and center could 
be utilized to win the hearts and minds of Muslims. Being the location of the two holy 
mosques, the Kingdom regularly receives delegations of prominent Islamic figures from 
all over the world. Saudi Arabia could take advantage of the import of these visits to 
strengthen its soft power policies against Iranian challenges. Foreign graduates from its 
universities, colleges and institutes could be indoctrinated to serve and propagate Saudi 
soft power policies. In this modern era, it would also be wise to consider the utilization of 
electronic techniques, such as the Internet or electronic books, in different languages 
actualize this effort. Also, Saudi Arabia must consider following the rest of the world 
regarding women employment endowment and the necessity of women’s participation in 
Saudi political and social life. 
Saudi Arabia educational and cultural programs, in order to combat Iran, should 
establish scientific research centers to detect social and cultural phenomena and find 
suitable solutions. The Kingdom should also consider the expansion of sponsorship study 
programs and attract foreign students to study in the Kingdom to prepare, qualify them in 
order to follow up with them after graduation, particularly those from Iran and Asian 
countries to illustrate the positive image of the Kingdom.  
An increase in the number of universities, schools, educational institutes abroad, 
particularly in countries neighboring Iran, and in developed countries as in the African 
continent, would also give Saudi Arabia an upper hand over Iran. These programs should 
hold debates and host scientific forums that encourage the participation of Arabic and 
Islamic elites, scientist, intellectuals, and cultural leaders to promote and grant 
opportunities that bolster the exchange ideas and the utilization of experiences gained at 
these conferences.  
Such programs would also benefit from the establishment of communication and 
translation centers in order to select books, periodicals, and translate them into different 
local languages of the Muslim nations. Programs ought to explain Islamic teachings and 
simplify them, making them suitable for Muslim minority audiences in their native 
languages. Educational and cultural programs are responsible for holding forums, debates 
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and scientific conferences with the participation of intellectuals and intellectual Iranian 
Shiites opposing the Faqih governance, to make use of their views and thoughts. 
Information programs ought to strengthen the broadcasts of Saudi radio stations, 
particularly the Quran Kareem, to ensure that they reach the largest audience of Muslim 
and other countries possible. Such programs should also support effective media in major 
countries which have regional and international influences (Radios, newspapers, 
channels, Internet, etc.). The Saudi government ought to expand the establishment of 
different mass media, newspapers, radio stations, air channels and websites in different 
languages. These establishments can then follow up on what is produced by different 
mass media organizations and reply to Shiite and Iranian views, identifying their lies and 
false information. Saudi Arabia should endorse mass media programs to enforce home 
country belongingness and defuse work information disseminated by Iran and supporters 
inside and outside of the Kingdom. The establishment of an air channel hosted under the 
Persian language addressed to an exclusively Iranian audience would also support the 
Saudi cause. Programs can co-operate with space channels and others of the mass media 
to defuse internal beliefs and contain the Shiite, Iranian expansion. 
Politically, Saudi Arabia should continue its domestic political and economic 
reform. Further measures include activating the rule of foreign embassies and consulates 
to criticize Iran’s plans to expand Shiism. Saudi Arabia should ensure excellent political 
relations with other countries, downsizing and surrounding the Iranian danger. The 
Kingdom should utilize its own status and its outstanding role in regional and 
international organizations to enforce the Saudi view point on the issue.  
Further efforts should include the formation of an alliance against Iran with states 
surrounding Iran. Saudi Arabia should also utilize its economic capabilities to influence 
Iran’s relations with other countries, particularly intellectual ones like Russia and China. 
Finally, one last political measure should involve the strengthening of moderate Shiites 
locally and abroad and encouraging their support against Iranian Shiite extremists. 
Saudi Arabia should utilize their investments abroad to combat Iranian influence. 
Controlling oil prices could effectively pressure the Iranian regime and limit its extremist 
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policies. All states should take advantage of the aid and support provided to their 
countries to stop the Shiite expansion and downsize Iranian rule. Islamic humanitarian 
aid, along with its foreign establishments, should be reactivated according to certain 
controlled mechanisms, such as regards for supervision on the type of work and 
management of financial resources. Saudi Arabia ought to expand Islamic humanitarian 
aid and rescue Muslims in disasters and fulfill the needs of cloths, medicines and life 
important needs, to cut the roads for Iranians who usually misuse this to publicize Shiism. 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should activate the participation of its security 
forces to develop security measures to confine terror activists, particularly those caused 
by Iranian Shiites in the eastern providence of the Kingdom or other crises during hajj 
and Umrah season. Saudi Arabia should work to dry the sources of Shiite extremist 
organizations in order to control the infiltration of Saudi money particularly from the 
donations which are leaking into terrorists group such as the Houthis in Yemen and 
Hezbollah in Lebanon that are obviously supported by Iran. Finally, Saudi Arabia ought 
to cooperate with security forces in neighboring countries to limit Shiite terrorism and its 
cooperation with Iranian regime. 
Saudi Arabians should utilize the Iranian challenges as an opportunity to develop 
its capabilities and skills in dominating the region. Saudi Arabia must reinforce its 
national unity and encourage coherent community through the unification of the various 
facets of its society and balancing of rights and duties among the people. This should 
include the Shiite population within the Kingdom as disincentive against Iran’s political 
ideology. There is also the need to establish a research center where Iran and its religious 
and political ideologies could be properly studied in order to establish the best courses of 
action against it. Amongst others, the research center should be able to establish the 
factors responsible for Shiite expansion as a precursor to effective employment of Saudi 
soft power. 
The Kingdom should invest significantly in the development of its armed forces 
as deterrence to Iran. This is because soft power by itself might not be enough to achieve 
Saudi’s strategic goals in the region. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia should embrace smart 
power, which is a combination of soft and hard powers in the right proportion. 
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Saudi Arabia should embark on a serious campaign against Iran through the 
electronic and print media to sensitize Muslims all over the world on the destructive 
political and religious trajectory pursued by that country within the region. Alongside, the 
Kingdom should intensify its endowments strategy to win the hearts and minds of 
Muslims—whether Shiite or Sunni, or any other Islamic division. Local Shiite leaders 
could be exploited to provide effective leadership among Shiite regions to calm the 
already tense situation. Finally, Saudi Arabia should intensify its diplomatic efforts to 
make more friends within the region, especially with those states within and outside the 
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